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Abstract 
A “shock therapy” might have different impacts between large and small firms.  In this paper, 
we focus on the clients of two large failed Japanese banks - the Long-term Credit Bank of Japan 
(LTCB) and the Nippon Credit Bank (NCB).  We first show that subsequent events after the 
bank failures allowed the new LTCB to adopt a “shock therapy” but kept the new NCB to face 
“soft budget constraints”.  We then show that the different therapies made performances of 
these two banks’ customers very different.  Under the shock therapy, large firms showed 
significant recovery of their profits but small firms did not.  In contrast, under the soft budget 
constraints, large firms did not show recovery and small firms experienced significant decline in 
their profits when the new bank terminated the banking relationship.     
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1.    Introduction 
Japanese economy experienced a prolonged banking crisis in the 1990s.  The trigger was 
the large stock and land price declines that began in early 1990s.  These negative shocks 
impaired collateral values dramatically so that many banks could not adjust to the shocks.    One 
appropriate prescription for the banking crisis would have been kicking out insolvent firms from 
the market.    However, under “soft budget constraints”, many Japanese banks had incentives to 
continue making credit available to weak firms, many of which were already insolvent.  The 
banks accepted the request for debt forgiveness and kept pouring loans into insolvent zombie 
firms.
1  The “soft budget constraints” might reduce temporary increases of adjustment costs.  
They, however, continue to avoid market discipline in cleaning up its economy.     
A defining characteristic of Japanese bank failures in the late 1990s was that the failed 
banks had concealed the true extent of their problems in order to reduce the reported amount of 
nonperforming loans on their book or to inflate their reported capital.    The market participants 
were thus suspicious against the valuation of the surviving clients of the troubled bank.   If the 
major lender allows insolvent firms to continue to operate, bad loan problems could result in 
fewer profitable investments by firms that are highly dependent on bank financing.    Under the 
circumstance, the “shock therapy” might have a positive impact on the market value of the 
clients through removing inefficiencies under the “soft budget constraints”. 
However, in the presence of asymmetric information and incomplete contract, banking 
relationships enhance the value of client firms (see, for example, Boot [2000] for overview of 
the literature).  This is particularly true for small firms that obtain most of their external 
                                                  
1  The terminology of “soft budget constraints” follows that in previous studies such as Dewatripont 
and Maskin (1995) and Berglöf and Roland (1995).    Recent empirical studies that explored 
negative consequences of “soft budget constraints” in Japanese banking sector include Peek and 
Rosengren (2005), Sekine, Kobayashi, and Saita (2003), Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2003), Ahearne 
and Shinada (2004), and Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2006).  3
financing from banks with which they established a relationship.  The relationship allows a 
Pareto-improving exchange of information between the borrower and the lender and thereby 
helps to mitigate some of the inefficiencies associated with one-shot incomplete contracting.  
The role of the banking relationships is particularly important during times of distress, when it 
changes the affiliated firm’s management and the board directors.  Monitoring performed by 
banks may help to overcome several problems associated with diffuse debt-holding.  Firms 
with strong bank-firm relationships may therefore be able to overcome financial distress better, 
giving such firms a more stable, informed, and committed source of financing. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a case study that explores how different 
consequences “soft budget constraints” and “shock therapy” had in improving performances of 
large and small borrowers in Japan.    In the analysis, we focus on the clients of two large failed 
Japanese banks - the Long-term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB) and the Nippon Credit Bank 
(NCB), and examine how their profits had changed after the banks’ operations were taken over 
by new banks.    The resolution of these two banks was a turning point of the government policy 
because it revealed that Japanese regulators would no longer use “too-big-to-fail” policy.   The 
failed banks, however, had different features on who took over their operations.  LTCB was 
sold to a group of American investors, who tried to introduce American management techniques 
as a bold new experiment in financial reform.  In the case of the clients of LTCB, the impacts 
therefore appeared as a “shock therapy” where there were dramatic increases of bankruptcies 
after the new bank started its operation.  NCB was, in contrast, sold to a group of domestic 
investors, who tried to follow traditional corporate ways in Japan.  In the case of the NCB’ 
clients, we thus see no dramatic increase of bankruptcies.  In the following analysis, we 
explore how the different features lead to different consequences for profitability of small and 
large client firms.      4
In previous literature, Fukuda and Koibuchi (2006) explored a similar issue by using stock 
prices of the borrowing firms.  They show that the surviving clients of LTCB showed 
significant recovery of their stock prices but that those of NCB did not.    The result implied that 
the “shock therapy” by the new banks was beneficial in improving the clients’ market valuation.   
Stock prices are, however, only loosely related to the market values of the firms.  More 
importantly, the use of stock prices limited our analysis to listed firms for which the role of 
banks became relatively smaller throughout the 1990s.    A new contribution of this paper is that 
we analyze performances of client firms including small unlisted firms.  A series of financial 
liberalization reduced the role of banks for most of listed Japanese companies in the 1990s.  
Banks, however, keep playing a dominant role in the financing of small and medium firms in 
Japan.  It is thus worthwhile to focus on unlisted firms for which the role of bank is more 
important.  It is likely that the “shock therapy”, which may make the bank-firm relationship 
unstable, has different impacts between large and small firms. 
Investigating the performances of client firms, we obtained information of the client firms 
of the two failed banks from the CD Eyes data set supplied by TSR Database Service.    The CD 
Eyes provides information of 500 thousands of listed and unlisted Japanese companies for each 
year.   In particular, it provides a list of major lenders of each company for each year.  The 
information allows us to investigate how different consequences were brought to profitability of 
small client firms by subsequent events after bank failures.   
A number of papers provide empirical evidence on adverse consequences for the clients of 
failed banks.
2    In particular, Brewer, Genay, Hunter, and Kaufman (2003) examine what effects 
                                                  
2  Using Japanese data, Gibson (1995) found that firm investment is sensitive to the financial health 
of the firm’s main bank, holding Tobin’s Q and cash flow constant.    Kang and Stulz (2000) showed 
that firms that were more dependent on bank finance suffered significantly larger wealth losses 
during the first 3 years of the 1990s when the Japanese stock market fell dramatically.    Klein, Peek, 
and Rosengren (2002) found that financial difficulties of Japanese banks were economically and 
statistically important in reducing the number of FDI projects by Japanese firms into the United  5
the failures of LTCB and NCB had on their customers in Japan.  They find that the stock 
returns of the customers unexpectedly declined at the time of failure announcement.
3  O u r  
results are in marked contrast with these studies in two respects.    One is that we focus not only 
on listed firms but also on small unlisted firms.    The other is that we show that who took over 
the operations is important in mitigating short-run and long-run consequences of the bank 
failures.  If banks had accumulated huge amounts of bad loans, their failures would be 
inevitable.    It is thus important to see who succeeds the operation and how the new bank could 
mitigate the adverse impacts of the bank failure.     
Bank regulation and supervision policies in Japan provided the troubled banks little 
incentive to be strict with troubled borrowers.    When their non-performing loans were piled up, 
the banks therefore followed a policy of forbearance with their problem borrowers in order to 
avoid pressure on the banks to increase their own loan loss reserves, further impairing their 
capital.  This leads to additional credit to troubled firms to enable them to make interest 
payments on outstanding loans and avoid or delay bankruptcy.  Keeping these troubled firms 
alive would distort resource allocation in the economy.  Rolling over the debt of problem 
borrowers may reduce the supply of credit available to healthy borrowers.  Even if the supply 
of credit does not decline, it may have various negative external impacts on healthy borrowers, 
especially when the market cannot distinguish between good and bad borrowers.  Depressing 
market prices for their products, raising market wages, and congesting the markets would be 
typical consequences of the negative externality. 
Under such circumstances, the “shock therapy” might increase profitable investments by 
solvent firms and have a desirable consequence for economic efficiency in the long-run.  
                                                                                                                                                  
States. 
3  Focusing on failure of Hokkaido Takusyoku Bank, Yamori and Murakami (1999), Hori and 
Takahashi (2003), and Hori (2005) examine the effects of the bank failure on their customers in 
Japan.  6
However, to the extent that imperfect information and incomplete contract are important, the 
inability of banks to perform their intermediary role would damage the real economy by 
disrupting the flow of credit.    It is thus possible that the “shock therapy” might have a perverse 
impact on performances of small and medium firms that have few alternative sources of funding.   
Our empirical results support this view through finding that the consequences are different 
between large and small firms. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  After outlining the two bank failures in section 2, we 
explain the data used in the analysis in section 3.  Section 4 explores the impacts on the 
number of bankruptcies.   Section 5 proposes the model and explains our methodology to test 
the hypothesis.  Section 6 presents our basic empirical results.  Section 7 summarizes our 
main results and refers to their implications. 
 
 
2. Two Large Bank Failures 
In the following analysis, we explore impacts of two large failed banks in Japan - the 
Long-term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB) failed on October 23, 1998 and the Nippon Credit 
Bank (NCB) failed on December 13, 1998.    LTCB and NCB were among the largest and most 
visible Japanese banks so resolved in the post-war Japan.    Table 1 reports the amounts of loans 
outstanding of these two banks as well as those of other major banks in March 1997 and in 
March 1998.  The amounts of the two banks were not so big as those of top six city banks.  
However, the amount of LTCB’s loans outstanding was the 10
th largest and was almost twice as 
much as that of NCB’s.     
LTCB was the second largest long-term credit bank.  Despite an injection of capital from 
the government in March 1998, its debt was downgraded several times and its share price  7
dropped sharply.  There was a regulator-sanctioned merger attempt to rescue LTCB.  The 
merger attempt with Sumitomo Trust Bank, however, failed in the beginning of October 1998.  
On October 19, 1998, news reports indicated that the newly established Financial Supervisory 
Agency (FSA) had informed LTCB earlier in the day that the bank was insolvent on a 
market-value basis as of the end of September, when it was last inspected.  The reports also 
indicated that LTCB was expected to be nationalized later in the week, when recently adopted 
banking legislation would take effect.    Four days later on October 23, 1998, LTCB applied for 
nationalization.  According to the FSA report, at the end of September, the bank had total 
assets of 24 trillion yen and 160 billion yen in book-value capital.  It also reports 500 billion 
yen, or three times its book value capital, of unrealized losses on its securities portfolio and 
other assets. 
NCB was the third largest long-term credit bank in Japan.  Founded as the Nippon Real 
Estate Bank in 1957, NCB traditionally focused on loans secured by land collateral.    The bank 
expanded its real estate related loans even more in the late 1980s.    As the land prices fell in the 
1990s, many of its real estate related loans and loans to non-bank affiliates became 
non-performing.  The semi-annual public financial statements issued by all Japanese banks on 
November 24, 1998, for six months ending September 30 showed that NCB with assets of 7.7 
trillion yen as of September 1998 had significant amount of problem loans and that its earnings 
had deteriorated significantly since March 1998.  However, the bank stated that it was still 
solvent.  On December 9, 1998, it was announced that NCB was abandoning its previously 
announced merger with Chuo Trust and Banking Co.    The abandoned merger was perceived as 
a sign of further problems at NCB.  Shortly thereafter, news reports indicated that the FSA’s 
examination of the bank showed that as of March 31, 1998, contrary to what NCB had reported, 
the bank had a capital deficit of 94.4 billion yen and was insolvent.  On December 12, the  8
government urged NCB to apply for nationalization, which it did on the next day – December 
13, and started special public management under the Financial Reconstruction Law.     
The resolution of these banks was a turning point of the government policy because it 
revealed that Japanese regulators would no longer use “too-big-to-fail” policy.  The 
government reactions to the two bank failures had several common features.  Both LTCB and 
NCB were nationalized first.  The government announced that it would guarantee all of their 
obligations; the bank’s bad loans were sold to the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC); and the 
Bank of Japan extended emergency loans to the banks during the transition period to provide 
liquidity to meet deposit outflows.    Their good assets were then sold to a consortium of private 
investors.  In both cases, the Financial Reconstruction Commission (FRC) invited bidders for 
these banks under the condition that sale was to take place quickly.   
When the government sold the nationalized LTCB and NCB to the private investors, the 
government promised the same “cancellation right” (warranty of loan related assets) to each of 
the new banks.    The “cancellation right”, or Kashi-tampo in Japanese, was bastardized version 
of a loss-sharing scheme, albeit potentially far more costly for the government.  Unlike 
standard loss-sharing arrangements that split any future losses between the government and the 
private investors, the government promised to provide a moderate level of reserves against loss 
on bad loans, using public funds.  It also guaranteed that during the first three years the 
purchaser could “return” any loan if they lost more than 20 percent of their value, provided that 
they also returned the relevant reserves.  If these reserves did not compensate the loss on the 
loan, the bank would then be compensated as well.  This was akin to a “put” option, or the 
right to sell the purchased loan at a future date in certain conditions, “putting” the loan back to 
the government if its value falls sufficiently low.     
The two failed banks, however, had different features on who took over their operations.   9
LTCB was sold to a group of American investors led by Ripplewood Holdings LLC, which paid 
1 billion yen for purchasing the bank and injected an additional 120 billion yen in capital.    The 
new LTCB started its operation on March 1, 2000 and changed its name to “Shinsei Bank” on 
June 5, 2000.  Almost since its inception, the new bank has been controversial figure in 
Japanese financial markets because it tried to introduce American management techniques as a 
bold new experiment in financial reform.  NCB was, in contrast, sold to a consortium of 
Japanese investors led by SOFTBANK CORP., ORIX Corporation, The Tokio Marine and Fire 
Insurance Co., Ltd., and other financial institutions.    Special public management ended and the 
new bank started its operation on September 1, 2000.  The new bank changed its name to 
“Aozora Bank” on January 2001.  A group of domestic investors tried to follow traditional 
corporate ways in Japan.  The new bank’s management behavior may be responding to 
significant government and public pressure to avoid a credit crunch that might occur if it were to 
reduce credit to troubled firms. 
Table 2 reports how loan outstanding of LTCB and NCB changed after the fiscal year 2000, 
based on Shinsei and Aozora’s Business Revitalization Plans each year.  For the new LTCB, 
total domestic loans and loans for small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) were near 7.5 and 
2.7 trillion yen respectively when it began its operations. These loans, however, sharply 
declined for four consecutive years by nearly 60% until FY2003.  The sharp declines partly 
reflected revaluation of the book value due to disposal of NPLs.    Even controlling the changes 
of loan outstanding driven by the revaluation, we can observe sharp decreases of loan 
outstanding immediately after the new LTCB took over the operations. 
In contrast, loans of the new NCB were almost constant until FY2003 even without 
controlling the changes of loan outstanding driven by the revaluation.  When we removed the 
changes coming from the disposal of NPLs, total domestic loans and loans for SMEs rather  10
increased every fiscal year.  The evidence is consistent with the view that the new NCB 
remained facing soft budget constrains and kept lending to insolvent firms. 
 
 
3.  Data 
In the following analysis, we investigate performance of LTCB’s and NCB’s client firms.  
Information of the client firms is based on the CD Eyes data set supplied by TSR Database 
Service.  Each version of the CD Eyes provides information of 500 thousands of listed and 
unlisted Japanese companies for each fiscal year (FY).   In particular, it provides a list of 
major lenders of each listed and unlisted company for each fiscal year.    We define the LTCB’s 
clients and NCB’s clients respectively by the non-financial firms for which each bank was listed 
as one of the major lenders in FY1998.     
Table 3 reports some summary statistics on the total number, the size, the amount of sales, 
and before-tax profit-sales ratio for client firms of LTCB and NCB in our sample.  For 
comparison, it also reports corresponding statistics for clients of the Industrial Bank of Japan 
(IBJ), the largest long-term credit bank in Japan.  When we look at all client firms for which 
each bank was listed as a major lender, the total number was 3,169 for LTCB, 1,503 for NCB, 
and 5,850 for IBJ in our sampled firms.    Like the amounts of loans outstanding in Table 1, the 
LTCB’s total number of the client firms was almost twice as much as that of NCB’s.  It was, 
however, nearly half of IBJ’s.     
The client firms’ characteristics are, however, similar among the three banks; the size of 
paid-in-capital was around 4 billion yen on average and about 150 to 280 million yen on 
median; the amount of sales was around 50 billion yen on average and about 6 to 8 billion on 
median.  These characteristics imply that the long-term credit banks had a tendency to lend to  11
larger companies than the other banks in Japan.   The medians, however, indicate that even the 
long-term credit banks had a significant number of small and medium-size clients.  The 
median of after-tax profit-sales ratio is also similar among the three banks.  The average of 
before-tax profit-sales ratio is similar between LTCB’s and NCB’s.  However, the averaged 
ratios for LTCB’s and NCB’s clients are much lower than that of IBJ’s clients.  This implies 
that both LTCB and NCB had a significant number of bad clients in the late 1990s, which 
eventually led them to be failed. 
The above characteristics are essentially the same even if we restrict the client firms to those 
that had closer relationships with LTCB and NCB: firms for which each bank was one of the top 
five lenders, one of the top three lenders, and the top lender respectively.  However, the 
number of the client firms declines dramatically when either LTCB or NCB was the top lender.   
More interestingly, when either LTCB or NCB was the top lender, the clients’ average 
before-tax profit-sales ratio declines dramatically; it took -0.107 when the LTCB was the top 
lender and -0.072 when the NCB was the top lender.    This implies that the client firms that had 
a very tight relationship with either LTCB or NCB tended to suffer big losses and possibly 
became insolvent in the late 1990s. 
Table 4 reports client firms’ distributions by industry for LTCB, NCB, and IBJ in our 
sample.    It also reports distributions of firms borrowing from both LTCB and NCB.    The table 
shows nearly one third of client firms belong to manufacturing sector.  This is a common 
characteristic among the three banks, although the share of manufacturing sector is slightly 
larger for IBJ.  Among non-manufacturing sectors, the share of wholesale & retail sector as 
well as that of service sector is large for all of the three banks.    The share of real estate sector is 
also significant for both LTCB and NCB.  In particular, when we focus on the client firms 
borrowing from both LTCB and NCB, the share of real estate sector goes up to 17.3%, while the  12
share of manufacturing sector drops down to 26%.  As the land prices fell in the 1990s, many 
of its real estate-related loans became non-performing.  The large share of real estate sector 
would be a source of big losses that LTCB and NCB suffered  from  in  the  late  1990s.           
 
 
4. The Impacts on the Number of Bankruptcies 
 When the borrowers of the two banks were roughly in the same initial condition, it is 
likely that managing styles of the new banks would be reflected in timing and frequency of the 
client firms’ bankruptcy.    Under shock therapy, there would be a dramatic surge of client firms’ 
bankruptcy soon after the new banks started the operations.  In contrast, under soft budget 
constraints, client firms would go bankrupt only gradually.  In this section, we investigate 
timing and frequency of the client firms’ bankruptcy of the two failed banks.   Specifically, we 
explore how the number of bankruptcies had changed for the client firms before and after the 
new banks took over the operations.  We define "bankruptcy" when a company is recognized 
as corresponding to any of the following 7 cases.  (1) Drawing unpaid notes two times and 
business is suspended.  (2) Dissolution of the company (when the representative admits being 
bankrupt).  (3) Applying for Corporate Rehabilitation Law to the court.  (4) Applying for 
dissolution arrangement under Commercial Code to the court.  (5) Applying for Civil 
Rehabilitation Law to the court.  (6) Applying for bankruptcy to the court.  (7) Applying for 
commencement of special liquidation proceedings to the court.  We collected the bankruptcy 
information of the client firms from 1999 to 2004 by TSR Database Service. 
Table 5 reports how the number and the total liability of bankrupt client firms had changed 
from 1999 to 2004 for the two failed bank.    Throughout the sample period, 226 LTCB’s client 
firms went bankrupt, and so did 132 NCB’s clients.  The resulting amount of liability of the  13
bankrupt client firms was 8 trillion yen for LTCB and 5 trillion yen for NCB.    These numbers 
are larger for LTCB than for NCB.  However, since the number of clients and the amount of 
loan outstanding of LTCB were twice as much as those of NCB, they mean that the clients of 
LTCB had slightly smaller bankruptcy probabilities than those of NCB for six years after the 
bank failures.  The results are essentially the same even if we focus on the client firms for 
which either LTCB or NCB was one of the top 5 lenders.  In terms of eventual bankruptcy 
probabilities, we may conclude that LTCB had slightly better quality of borrowers than NCB. 
The clients of LTCB, however, had a remarkable feature in that most of the bankruptcies 
had occurred in two years after the new bank, “Shinsei Bank”, took over the LTCB’ operation.  
The number of bankrupt LTCB’s clients was particularly large soon after the new bank started 
its operation; 47 LTCB’s clients went bankrupt in the first half of 2000.    The tendency become 
more conspicuous when we focus on the client firms for which LTCB was one of the top 5 
lenders.  The result implies that the new LTCB introduced American management techniques 
as a bold new experiment and killed many of insolvent clients as a “shock therapy”.    The surge 
of bankruptcies, however, did not persist; very few LTCB’s clients went bankrupt after the 
second half of 2003.    In contrast, we see no significant increase of bankruptcies for the clients 
of NCB even after the new bank started its operation in September 2000.    This was particularly 
true for those for which NCB was one of the top 5 lenders.  This suggests that the new NCB 
followed traditional corporate ways in Japan and kept practicing soft budget constraints.    It is, 
however, noteworthy that the number and the total liability of bankrupt clients remained high 
for the NCB’s clients throughout the period and that eventual bankruptcy probabilities became 
slightly higher for the NCB’s clients than for the LTCB’s.  This indicates that the new NCB 
had accepted the request for debt forgiveness pouring loans into insolvent zombie firms, which 
eventually went bankrupt.  14
One may argue that the “shock therapy” by the new LTCB is partly attributable to the 
“cancellation right” (warranty of loan related assets), that allowed the new LTCB to return the 
assets to the government for liquidation if their value fell sufficiently.    The right influenced the 
banks’ management of the existing loans and made the banks reluctant to rollover the loans if 
there were reasonable expectations of losses.  In particular, the compensation from the 
government motivated the banks not to grant major concessions to avoid liquidation of bad 
loans.  It is, however, worthwhile to note that the government agreed the same rules for the 
sale contract with both the new LTCB and the new NCB.    The different consequences between 
LTCB’s and NCB’s clients are thus largely attributable to different management strategies taken 
by the new banks rather than to the form of sale contract such as the “cancellation right”. 
 
 
5. The Basic Specification 
If the bank keeps practicing “soft budget constraints”, it would have little incentive to be 
strict with troubled borrowers.  When its non-performing loans are piled up, the bank would 
therefore follow a policy of forbearance with its problem borrowers in order to avoid pressure 
on the bank to increase its own loan loss reserves, further impairing its capital.  Under such 
circumstances, average profits of the client firms would remain low.  However, if dramatic 
increases of bankruptcies clear up most of insolvent clients, average quality of surviving clients 
would become high.  In particular, if market participants perceive the “shock therapy” of the 
new bank as positive news, decreased default risk may improve the value of healthy firms.  
This may happen when decreased default risk increases the availability of additional products, 
parts, and service among the clients.    The price a customer is willing to pay for durable goods 
may go up as the probability of the firm’s liquidation decreases reflecting the decline of  15
expected maintenance costs.  More importantly, when default risk is low, turnovers of good 
employees would decline.  To the extent that these favorable consequences are large, the 
“shock therapy” of the new bank might have a positive impact on average profits of the 
surviving clients. 
However, banking relationships may overcome the problems of asymmetric information and 
incomplete contract and enhance the value of client firms.  This is particularly true for small 
firms that obtain most of their external financing from banks with which they established a 
relationship.  To the extent that the lack of public information impedes a smaller firm’s access 
to capital markets, relationship lending would be important to improve the inefficiencies 
through appropriate contract design and/or the bank’s ability to acquire the necessary 
information.    The bank-firm relationship tends to be unstable under the “shock therapy”, while 
it tends to be stable under the “soft budget constraints”.  It is therefore likely that the “shock 
therapy” and “soft budget constraints” may have different impacts between large and small 
firms.  
In the following sections, we will test this hypothesis by investigating how the profits of the 
large and small surviving clients responded to subsequent events after the bank failures.  The 
profits are before-tax profits of the client firms.    The annual profits of the surviving clients are 
examined to identify any abnormal performance after the new banks started their operations.     
The basic equation is as follows: 
 
(1)  Πi = constant + α Π
0
i + β SG i + γ1 LTCB i1 + γ2 LTCB i2 + δ1 NCB i1 + δ2 NCB i2, 
 
where  Πi is average before-tax profits of firm i from FY2001 to FY2003, Π
0
i is average 
before-tax profits of firm i from FY1996 to FY1998, and SG i is growth rate of sales from  16
FY1996-98 to FY2003.    Both LTCB i1 and LTCB i2 are dummy variables for the clients that had 
LTCB as one of the top 5 lenders in FY1998.  The dummy variable LTCB i1 equals to 1 when 
firm i had the new LTCB in its lender’s list in FY2004 and zero otherwise, while LTCB i2 equals 
to 1 when firm i no longer had the new LTCB in its lender’s list in FY2004 and zero otherwise.   
The variables NCB i1 and NCB i2 are corresponding dummies for the NCB’s clients.  We 
estimate equation (1) with and without an auxiliary variable SG i.  
In equation (1), we relate the clients’ profits to the two types of dummies for each failed 
bank’s clients.    The dummy variables are included to measure how different profits the clients 
had depending on persistence of their banking relationships after the new banks started the 
operations.  The coefficients of the dummy variables LTCB i1 and NCB i1 would be positive if 
the two banks’ clients increased their profits when keeping the bank-firm relationship with 
LTCB or NCB until FY2004.  The coefficients of the dummy variables LTCB i2 and NCB i2 
would be negative if the two banks’ clients decreased their profits when loosing the bank-firm 
relationship with LTCB or NCB before FY2004.    We estimate equation (1) with Π
0
i as well as 
industry dummies.  The industry dummies are dummies for 9 industries using manufacturing 
industry as a benchmark.  The industry dummies are included to account for unobserved 
industry “fixed effects”. 
The explanatory variable Π
0
i, which reflects the clients’ profitability before the bank failures, 
is included to capture the firm-specific performance before the new bank started.  As we 
discussed in Table 2, it is likely that the failed bank’s clients had poorer performance than their 
competitors.  However, to the extent that the poorer performance was reported in financial 
conditions of the clients, the poor performance would be reflected in Π
0
i.  The dummy 
variables would therefore reflect the profits’ responses to news after each new bank started the 
operation.    17
The sampled firms are the non-financial client firms of LTCB, NCB, and IBJ which are 
available in both the 1999 year version and the 2004 year version of CD Eyes.  We  restrict  the 
sampled firms to the client firms of the three long-term credit banks because types of customers 
could be different among different types of banks.    As we discussed in Table 3 and Table 4, the 
three long-term credit banks had intrinsically similar types of customers that the other banks did 
not in 1998.  Allowing different degrees of the banking relationship tightness, we collect two 
samples of firms.  The first sample consists of the three banks’ clients for which one of the 
three banks is at least in the list of top 10 lenders.  The second sample consists of the three 
banks’ clients for which one of the three banks is at least in the list of top 5 lenders.    Needless 
to say, the banking relationship is tighter for the second sample than for the first.  In both 
samples, we exclude public or semi-public firms, non-profit organizations, and firms for which 
relevant financial variables are missing.  We also exclude outlier client firms whose 
profit-sales ratio exceeds 1.5 in order to rule out the cases where bad firms had temporary 
special gains from debt renegotiation.  They allow us to have 6,006 firms in the first sample 
and 4,601 firms in the second sample. 
Table 6 reports how many clients in the second sample kept the bank-firm relationship with 
LTCB or NCB until FY2004 and how many clients did not.    As for the LTCB’s clients that had 
a close banking relationship in FY1998, only 26% kept the relationship until FY2004 and 50% 
lost the relationship in FY2004 even if they were still alive.    In contrast, for the NCB’s clients 
that had a close bank relationship in FY1998, 37% kept the relationship until FY2004.  
Although 35% surviving clients lost the relationship in FY2004, the NCB’s clients had more 
persistent relationship than the LTCB’s.  This provides another evidence that the new LTCB 
introduced a shock therapy but the new NCB did not. 
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6. Estimation Results 
For the two samples of the firms, we estimate (1) dividing the sampled firms depending on 
their capital sizes: large size and small size.  In Table 7-1 to Table 7-3, we summarize our 
estimation results by size with and without industry dummies; Table 7-1 for all size clients, 
Table 7-2 for large-size clients (with capital over 100 million yen in 1998), Table 7-3 for 
small-size clients (with capital of less than 100 million yen in 1998).  In Table 7-4, we also 
report the Wald test statistic for each of three null hypotheses: γ1 = γ2, γ1 = δ1, and δ1 = δ2 of the 
first sample for the large-size clients and for the small-size clients respectively.    Regardless of 
the banking relationship tightness, the model specification, and the capital size of the client 
firms,  Π
0
i is positive and statistically significant.  This implies that there was significant 
coherency of the clients’ profits during the estimation period.    The dummy variables, however, 
took different signs depending not only on the persistence of the bank-firm relationship but also 
on the capital size of the client firms.     
The coefficient of LTCB i1 took a positive value for all sizes of sampled firms.  In 
particular, it was statistically significant for the large firms.  This suggests that the surviving 
large LTCB’s clients, who kept the banking relationship with LTCB, experienced larger 
increases of their profits than the other firms after the new bank took over the operation of 
LTCB.  Since there were temporary but dramatic increases of bankruptcies of the LTCB’s 
clients during the same period, the result is consistent with the view that the “shock therapy” of 
the new bank was beneficial, generating a positive impact on the profits of the surviving clients.   
The “soft budget constraints” would have kept pouring loans into insolvent zombie firms.  
Under such circumstances, the “shock therapy” might increase profitable investments by solvent 
firms and have a desirable consequence for economic efficiency in the long-run.  The  19
estimated coefficients of LTCB i1 took 0.013 to 0.014 for the large-size firms.  The positive 
impacts exist even for the LTCB’s surviving large clients that lost the banking relationship; the 
estimated coefficients of LTCB i2 took 0.004 to 0.005 for the large-size firms, although none of 
them is statistically significant.    The Wald test statistic under the null hypothesis, γ1 = γ2, takes 
relatively large value, 1.638, although its significance level is marginal. 
It is, however, noteworthy that the coefficient of LTCBi1 was no longer significantly 
positive for the smaller firms with capital less than 1 billion yen.    The estimated coefficients of 
LTCBi1 and LTCBi2 were close to zero and were not statistically significant for the small-size 
firms.  The Wald test statistic cannot reject the null hypothesis that γ1 = γ2.  Increasing their 
profits after the new bank took over the operation of LTCB, large surviving LTCB’s clients 
enjoyed the benefits but small clients did not even they kept the relationship with the New 
LTCB.  Small-size firms obtain most of their external financing from banks with which they 
established a stable relationship.    Since the relationship enhances the value of the client firm, it 
is straightforward to see that its instability had an adverse consequence for the small-size clients.   
Our result is consistent with the view that the beneficial impact of the “shock therapy” disappears 
for small-size firms under the adverse consequence.   
In contrast, the coefficient of NCBi1 was never significantly positive regardless of capital 
sizes.  The estimated coefficients of NCBi1 and NCBi2 were negative for the large-size firms, 
although neither of them was significant.    The Wald test statistic rejects the null hypothesis that 
γ1 = δ1 at 10 % significance level for the large-size clients.    The negative coefficient of NCBi1 
indicates that the surviving NCB’s clients did not improve their profits even when they kept the 
banking relationship with the new NCB.  Since there were no dramatic increases of 
bankruptcies of the NCB’s clients during the same period, the result is consistent with the view 
that the “soft budget constraints” was not beneficial in improving the profits of the surviving  20
clients.  The “soft budget constraints” might reduce temporary increases of adjustment costs.  
But when the main bank allowed insolvent firms to continue to operate, bad loan problems 
resulted in fewer profitable investments by firms.  The insignificant coefficient of NCBi1 is 
consistent with this view. 
However, the estimated coefficients of NCBi1 took relatively large positive value, 0.006 to 
0.011, for the small-size clients, even though none of them is statistically significant.  The 
estimated values are larger than those of LTCBi1 for the small-size clients, although the Wald 
test statistic cannot reject the null hypothesis that γ1 = δ1.    More importantly, the coefficient of 
NCBi2 took a negative sign for all sampled firms, particularly for the small firms with capital 
less than 1 million yen.  The estimated coefficient was about -0.031 for all sampled firms and 
was about -0.055 for the small-size clients.  This suggests that the small-size NCB’s clients, 
who could not keep the banking relationship with NCB, experienced larger decreases of their 
profits than the other firms.    When the bank practices “soft budget constraints”, it tends to keep 
the bank-firm relationship unless the customer terminates the relationship voluntarily or its 
performance turns out to be extremely bad.  Since it is less likely that a small firm terminates 
the relationship voluntarily, the termination of bank-firm relationship is generally a very bad 
signal for the small firm.    The negative sign of NCBi2 may reflect the bad signals. 
To the extent that imperfect information and incomplete contract are important, the inability 
of banks to perform their intermediary role would damage the real economy by disrupting the 
flow of credit.  In particular, small and medium firms obtain most of their external financing 
from banks with which they established a relationship.  Under the circumstances, losses from 
losing the bank-firm relationship would be very large for small and medium firms even if the 
bank keeps practicing the soft budget constraints.  The above result for the small-size firms 
supports this view.  The costs of the soft budget constraints would be very big for large-size  21
firms.  They may also be big for small-size firms when the banking relationship was 
terminated.  However, the costs might not be big for small-size firms when the banking 




In this paper, we explored what consequences “soft budget constraints” and “shock therapy” 
had in solving bad loan problems in Japan.  In the analysis, we focused on the clients of the 
two large failed Japanese banks, and examined how the number of their bankruptcies and their 
profits had changed after the banks’ operations were taken over by the new banks.  As for the 
clients of LTCB, there were dramatic increases of bankruptcies in the short-run but the surviving 
large-size clients started to show significant recovery of their profits in the long-run.  In 
contrast, as for the large-size clients of NCB, there was neither dramatic increase of 
bankruptcies in the short-run nor significant recovery of their profits in the long-run.  The 
result implies that the shock therapy had more beneficial impacts on the large-size clients.  
However, the consequences of “shock therapy” were quite different for small-size firms.  We 
could observe no significant recovery of the profits for the LTCB’s small-size clients, while we 
observed significantly large decreases of the profits for the NCB’s small-size clients when the 
bank-firm relationship was terminated.    The banking relationships would enhance the value of 
small-size client firms that face more serious problems of asymmetric information and incomplete 
contract.  It is natural that the shock therapy, which may make the bank-firm relationship 
unstable, had different impacts between large and small firms. 
It is widely recognized that the problem of “bad loans” was one of the major sources for 
why the slump had been prolonged after the collapse of the asset price bubble of the late 1980s.    22
Bank regulation and supervision policies in Japan provided banks little incentive to be strict 
with troubled borrowers.  The problems in the banking sector could result in fewer profitable 
investments by firms that are highly dependent on bank financing and exacerbated 
macroeconomic problems by promoting the allocation of credit to many of less productive firms.   
Under the circumstances, “shock therapy” would be an appropriate prescription in solving the 
problem for large firms that can assess to alternative sources of funding.    We, however, need to 
be more careful when applying the “shock therapy” for small-size firms.  The inability of 
banks to perform their intermediary role would disrupt the flow of credit to small and medium 
firms that obtain most of their external financing from banks.  It is possible that the “shock 
therapy” might have a perverse impact on performances of small-size firms.      23
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Hokkaido Takushoku 6,971 5,929
Table 1: Loans outstanding by major banks
Source: unconsolidated financial statements of each bank
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Mar.2000 End FY2000End FY2001End FY2002End FY2003
7,497.0 6,000.0 4,846.1 3,502.4 3,081.4
Changes of loan outstanding from the
previous fiscal year end (A)
- -1,497.0 -1,153.9 -1,343.7 -421.0
Disposal of NPLs (B) - 397.6 698.4 911.4 229.5
Changes of loan outstanding except
disposal of NPLs  (A)+(B)
- -1,099.4 -455.5 -432.3 -191.5
2,675.8 2,246.8 2,159.5 1,651.3 1126.4*
Changes of loan outstanding from the
previous fiscal year end (A)
- -429.0 -87.3 -508.2 -99.8*
Disposal of NPLs (B) - 88.2 211.7 550.0 110.1
Changes of loan outstanding except
disposal of NPLs  (A)+(B)
- -340.8 124.4 41.8 10.2
Sept.2000End FY2000End FY2001End FY2002End FY2003
3,062.8 3,065.4 3,270.4 3,227.2 2,927.4
Changes of loan outstanding from the
previous fiscal year end (A)
- 2.6 205.0 -43.2 -299.8
Disposal of NPLs (B) - 960.0 124.3 238.1 472.8
Changes of loan outstanding except
disposal of NPLs (A)+(B)
- 962.6 329.3 194.9 173.0
1,160.7 1,081.0 1,141.6 1,040.0 797.5*
Changes of loan outstanding from the
previous fiscal year end (A)
- -79.7 60.6 -101.6 -241.1*
Disposal of NPLs (B) - 862.4 36.7 148.2 254.1
Changes of loan outstanding except
disposal of NPLs  (A)+(B)
- 782.7 97.3 46.6 13.0
Notes:
Table 2. Transition of loan outstanding of New LTCB and New NCB
Source: Shinsei and Aozora's reports on their business revitalization plans, submitted to the Financial
Service Agency each half of the fiscal year.
Outstanding of total domestic loans
Outstanding of loans for SMEs
 Unit: billions of yen
 Unit: billions of yen
1). New LTCB started its operation on March 1, 2000, and new NCB started its operation on September
1, 2000. Fiscal Year (FY) in Japan is ended on March 31.
3). Small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) are defined as firms with capital of less than 300 million
yen (100 million yen for wholesalers, and 50 million yen for retailers and service sector) or 300 full-time
employees (100 for wholesalers and service sector, and 50 for retailers).  Loans for the bank's
consolidated subsidiaries and affiliates accounted for by the equity method are excluded from the figures
in FY2003 (*). Resulting discontinuities between FY2002 and FY2003 are corrected by aouthers
according to information in the FY2003 reports .
2). Total domestic loans and loans for SMEs exclude foreign currency lending for domestic citizens
(called "impact loan" in Japan).
Outstanding of loans for SMEs
2. New NCB (Aozora Bank)
1. New LTCB (Shinsei Bank)
















4,521 200 51,057 6,963 -0.012 0.006
2,259
(71%)
3,302 160 38,892 5,451 -0.014 0.006
1,298
(41%)
2,790 115 25,407 4,075 -0.029 0.005
248
(8%)
















3,875 150 41,895 5,691 -0.018 0.005
1,040
(69%)
2,610 100 27,953 4,307 -0.020 0.004
605
(40%)
1,727 98 17,815 3,237 -0.039 0.004
125
(8%)
















4,332 283 56,660 8,689 -0.001 0.007
4,611
(79%)
3,941 243 49,051 7,555 -0.001 0.007
2,957
(51%)
4,334 274 40,205 7,020 -0.000 0.007
855
(15%)
5,545 400 49,756 7,970 -0.008 0.006
Source: TSR CD-EYEs






Capital as of 1998
(million yen)





LTCB clients as of FY1998
Clients that had LTCB as a
Top5 lender as of FY1998
Clients that had LTCB as a
Top3 lender as of FY1998
Clients that had LTCB as a






Capital as of 1998
(million yen)





NCB clients as of FY1998
Clients that had NCB as a
Top5 lender as of FY1998
Clients that had NCB as a
Top3 lender as of FY1998
Clients that had NCB as a




IBJ clients as of FY1998
Clients that had IBJ as a
Top5 lender as of FY1998
Clients that had IBJ as a






Capital as of 1998
(million yen)
Amount of Sales as of
1998 (million yen)
Clients that had IBJ as a
Top1 lender as of FY1998
Notes 1). The "client" of the banks is identified if a company reported that each bank was one of the lenders as of FY1998.
          2). When the data of three consecutive fiscal years was not available, we took average of one or two fiscal years.

















All industries 3,169 (100.0%) 1,503 (100.0%) 426 (100.0%) 5,850 (100.0%)
Manufacturers 1,029 (32.4%) 472 (31.4%) 111 (26.0%) 2,274 (38.8%)
Agriculture 8 (0.2%) 3 (0.1%) 1 (0.2%) 5 (0.0%)
Fishery 4 (0.1%) 3 (0.1%) 2 (0.4%) 4 (0.0%)
Mining 25 (0.7%) 11 (0.7%) 5 (1.1%) 52 (0.8%)
Construction 172 (5.4%) 100 (6.6%) 22 (5.1%) 323 (5.5%)
Transportation
&Telecommunication
304 (9.5%) 105 (6.9%) 40 (9.3%) 572 (9.7%)
Wholesale&Retail 722 (22.7%) 253 (16.8%) 50 (11.7%) 1,295 (22.1%)
Real Estate 297 (9.3%) 228 (15.1%) 74 (17.3%) 390 (6.6%)
Service 608 (19.1%) 328 (21.8%) 121 (28.4%) 935 (15.9%)
Source: TSR CD-EYEs
Table 4:  Clients of LTCB, NCB and IBJ as of 1998 by industry
Notes 1). The "client" of the banks is identified if a company reported that each bank was one of the lenders as of FY1998.
          2). The sample excludes all financial institutions and gas & electric power companies.
         3). When the company belongs to multiple industries, we chose the industry that appeared first in the list.
LTCB clients as of
1998
NCB clients as of
1998
Clients having both of
LTCB and NCB as
major lenders as of
1998
IBJ clients as of 1998 29
























L T C B  c l i e n t s 1 34 72 71 63 62 41 42 8 9 9 3 2 2 6
(Clients having
LTCB as a Top5
lender)
(12) (46) (22) (14) (30) (15) (10) (19) (8) (8) (2) (186)
N C B  c l i e n t s 6 1 21 3 6 1 91 21 52 31 41 0 2 1 3 2
(Clients having
NCB as a Top5
lender)
(5) (12) (6) (5) (14) (9) (11) (19) (14) (10) (1) (106)
























LTCB clients 210 3,694 1,368 341 1,429 501 196 334 117 255 26 8,476
(Clients having
LTCB as a Top5
lender)
(202) (3,686) (1,276) (264) (1,397) (286) (158) (246) (99) (241) (23) (7,882)
NCB clients 58 668 318 216 1,097 559 688 792 379 249 99 5,129
(Clients having
NCB as a Top5
lender)
(48) (668) (177) (202) (589) (227) (261) (746) (379) (249) (97) (3,647)
Table 5: Summary for bankrupt clients borrowing from LTCB or NCB






Notes 1). The first half of fiscal year (FY) is from April 1 to September 30, and the second half is from October 1 to March 31.
          2). The client of the two failed banks is identified if each bank was one of the major lenders as of FY1998.
FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003
          3). The sample excludes all financial institutions and gas & electric power companies.
          4). The LTCB failed in October 1998 and the new LTCB started its operation in March 2000.
          5). The NCB failed in December 1998 and the new NCB started its operation in September 2000.
Source: Tokyo Shoko Research (TSR)   30
1. Clients having LTCB as a Top5 lender
Number of clients
(percentage of total clients)
2,259
(100%)




Clients that have no lending relationship with
Shinsei as of 2004
1,138
(50%)
Clients merged with other companies as of 2004 350
(15%)
Bankrupt clients as of  2004 186
(8%)
2. Clients having NCB as a Top5 lender
Number of clients
(percentage of total clients)
1,040
(100%)




Clients that have no lending relationship with
Aozora as of 2004
363
(35%)
Clients merged with other companies as of 2004 184
(18%)
Bankrupt clients as of  2004 107
(10%)
Source: TSR CD-EYEs and bankrupt companies' data by TSR
Clients that had NCB as a Top5 lender as of 1998
Table 6: Status of LTCB and NCB clients as of 2004
Clients that had LTCB as a Top5 lender as of 1998
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Table 7-1: The impacts on profitability of all clients
Sample: All non-financial clients borrowing from the IBJ, LTCB or NCB in 1998
Dependent Variable: Before-tax profit / Sales (average between FY2001 and  FY2003)
0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.906) (1.186) (0.723) (0.914)
0.260*** 0.260*** 0.289*** 0.289***
(17.333) (17.309) (15.848) (15.847)
0.001* 0.001* 0.000 0.000
(1.724) (1.808) (1.410) (1.484)
0.010* 0.010* 0.009 0.010
(1.801) (1.826) (1.557) (1.613)
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.420) (0.477) (0.298) (0.383)
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.134) (0.477) (0.074) (0.234)
-0.032*** -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.030***
(-4.317) (-4.044) (-3.988) (-3.710)
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes
Number of Observations 6,006 6,006 4,601 4,601
Note 1). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The asterisk, ***, **, or *, means that the coefficient is
significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
Note 2). The sample firms are all non-financial clients borrowiing from the IBJ, LTCB or NCB as of
FY1998 excluding gas & electric power companies. Two firms with very high befre-tax profit / sales ratio
(over 1.5) are eliminated. We also restrict our sample to clients having complete financial data of three
consecutive fiscal years from FY2001 to FY2003.
Constant Term
NCBi1
Before-tax Profit / Sales (average
between FY1996 and FY1998)
LTCBi1
LTCBi2
Growth of Sales (from average
FY1996-98 to FY2003)
the first sample the second sample
NCBi2
Clients of LTCB, NCB or IBJ as a
TOP10 lender
Clients of LTCB, NCB or IBJ as a
TOP5 lender
  32
Table 7-2: The impacts on profitability of large-size clients
Sample: Non-financial large-size clients borrowing from the IBJ, LTCB or NCB in 1998
Dependent Variable: Before-tax profit / Sales (average between FY2001 and  FY2003)
0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.227) (0.486) (-0.077) (0.278)
0.206*** 0.205*** 0.239*** 0.237***
(14.325) (14.204) (13.519) (13.381)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.505) (1.562) (1.227) (1.299)
0.014** 0.013** 0.014** 0.014**
(2.323) (2.220) (2.111) (2.089)
0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.963) (0.827) (0.897) (0.830)
-0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005
(-0.753) (-0.825) (-0.645) (-0.654)
-0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013
(-1.639) (-1.585) (-1.416) (-1.287)
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes
Number of Observations 4,050 4,050 3,034 3,034
Note 2). The sample firms are all non-financial clients borrowiing from the IBJ, LTCB or NCB as of
FY1998 excluding gas & electric power companies. Two firms with very high befre-tax profit / sales ratio
(over 1.5) are eliminated. We also restrict our sample to clients having complete financial data of three
consecutive fiscal years from FY2001 to FY2003.
Constant Term
Before-tax Profit / Sales (average
between FY1996 and FY1998)






Note 1). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The asterisk, ***, **, or *, means that the coefficient is
significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
Clients of LTCB, NCB or IBJ as a
TOP10 lender
Clients of LTCB, NCB or IBJ as a
TOP5 lender
the first sample the second sample
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Table 7-3: The impacts on profitability of small-size clients
Sample: Non-financial small-size clients borrowing from the IBJ, LTCB or NCB in 1998
Dependent Variable: Before-tax profit / Sales (average between FY2001 and  FY2003)
-0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002
(-0.454) (0.308) (0.052) (0.342)
0.745*** 0.776*** 0.704*** 0.733***
(13.596) (14.147) (11.028) (11.421)
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003
(0.336) (0.757) (0.413) (0.800)
0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.001
(0.021) (0.235) (-0.067) (0.140)
-0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.001
(-0.173) (0.017) (-0.332) (-0.130)
0.007 0.011 0.006 0.010
(0.558) (0.903) (0.453) (0.754)
-0.056*** -0.052*** -0.058*** -0.053***
(-4.502) (-4.139) (-4.242) (-3.890)
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes
Number of Observations 1,956 1,956 1,567 1,567
Note 1). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The asterisk, ***, **, or *, means that the coefficient is
significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
Note 2). The sample firms are all non-financial clients borrowiing from the IBJ, LTCB or NCB as of FY1998
excluding gas & electric power companies. We also restrict our sample to clients having complete financial
data of three consecutive fiscal years from FY2001 to FY2003.
Constant Term
Before-tax Profit / Sales (average
between FY1996 and FY1998)
NCBi2





Clients of LTCB, NCB or IBJ as a
TOP10 lender
Clients of LTCB, NCB or IBJ as a
TOP5 lender
the first sample the second sample 34
Table 7-4: Summary of the Wald tests for coefficient restrictions
γ1 = γ2 γ1 = δ1 δ1 = δ2

















Note 1). Each column reports the F-statisitics and p-values (within parentheses) for the Wald test under
each null hypothesis. The asterisk, ***, **, or *, implies that the Wald test statistic rejects the null
hypothesis at 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
Sample
Note 2). The results reported in the table do not depend on choice of the sample (the first or second
sample) and choice of the specification (with or without industry dummies).
 